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THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE TENTH
AMENDMENT
DAYTON C. CASTO, JR.*
O NE of the oldest principles of constitutional law which the
courts have applied in interpretation of the United States
Constitution is that "real effect is to be given to every word, sec-
tion and clause of the instrument."1 However, in light of the
language of the Supreme Court that "The Amendment (Tenth)
states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surren-
dered ' 2 it seems that the present Court has discarded this rule of
interpretation. It is the purpose of this paper to inquire into the
history and application of the Tenth Amendment to attempt to
determine if it does express "but a truism", with all due respect
for the Court which stated this, or whether there is and was in-
tended to be a "real effect" in it with regard to our constitutional
system of government.
In order to determine this answer it will be necessary to keep
in mind the two predomipantly conflicting provisions of the Con-
stitution which have given the courts so much trouble. The con-
flict between "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance, thereof; and all treaties made,
or which shall be made under the authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state
shall be bound thereby anything in the Constitution or laws of any
State to the contrary notwithstanding"3 and "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people",4 has been a major one in the United States' constitutional
history.
This problem has been met principally in two ways by the
courts and the way in which they disposed of the problem depended
upon the individual court's philosophy of the Federal-State system
of government. The political philosophies of the courts,- which
caused them to choose one of these methods of interpretation of the
With Civil Aeronautics Board, Washington, D. C.
See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803); Martin v. Hunters
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1883);
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 451 5th ed. 1891).
2 Darby v. United States, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1940).
3 U. S. CONST. Art. VI, § 2.
4 U. S. CONST. Amend. X.
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Constitution, have come to be known as the Hamiltonian and
Madisonian theories.0
The Hamiltonians hold that the Constitution established a
National Government whose powers are sovereign and which is
under no constitutional compulsion, either in the selection of
means whereby to make its powers effective or in the selection of
objects to be attained by their exercise, to take account of the co-
existence of the states or to concern itself to preserve any particular
relationship of power between itself and the states. The Madison-
ians look upon the Constitution as establishing a compact among
the states which requires that its interpretation be directed to the
preservation in the states of their accustomed powers and that the
National Government concern itself with matters of external rela-
tionship while the states are left to regulate internal affairs.
In applying the former theory to a specific case the court de-
termines if the law of Congress in question was made pursuant to
any power granted in the Constitution and upon finding this it
does not look further for under this view the supremacy clause
overrides all constitutions or laws of the states to the contrary. In
following the latter theory the court also has to determine if the
law was made pursuant to a power of the Constitution, but upon
such finding it then considers the powers reserved to the states by
the Tenth Amendment to see if Congress has encroached upon them
and if so the law must fail as being in conflict with the Amend-
ment.
The courts which have followed the second method have based
their logic upon another well-recognized rule of interpretation of
constitutions, i. e., if there is to some extent an inconsistency be-
tween a provision of the constitution as originally adopted, and
another provision which has been added by amendment, so that one
or the other must yield, the subsequent provision, being the last
expression of the sovereign will of the people, will prevail as an
See 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 1, et seq.
(Rev. ed. 1937).
6See CORWIN, TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT 47, 48 (1934). However,
see HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND
Pouncs 1789-1835 218 (1944). Professor Haines prefers to refer to the two
theories as Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian. There was, however, a distinct dif-
ference in .Jefferson's ideas of government and those of Madison and the Court
seems never to have gone so far or rather restricted the government's power as
much as Jefferson would have desired. See E.LIOTT, BIOGRAPHICAL STORY OF
THE CONSTITrnON 29, 79, 103 (1910) for a comparison of the three men.
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implied modification pro tanto of the former provision/ This
basic fundamental in constitutional government has been grossly
overlooked or ignored by those decisions which followed the Ham-
iltonian theory.
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized this rule of inter-
pretation on numerous occasions s and on others has impliedly ac-
cepted it without comment. 9 In the large number of cases dealing
with the Tenth Amendment the Court has but one time stated this
rule: "Whilst undoubtedly both the Fifth and Tenth Amendments
qualify, in so far as they are applicable, all the provisions of the
Constitution nothing in those Amendments operates to take away
the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution on Con-
gress"'" (emphasis added). The Court apparently presumes that
this rule is so primary and well known that specific statement of it
is not-necessary when giving effect to an amendment over a pre-
vious conflicting part of the Constitution. The many decisions
giving full effect to the Tenth Amendment must of necessity im-
pliedly recognize -its modification of the powers of Congress and
the supremacy clause.
An amendment of the same import as the Tenth was foremost
in the consideration of the constitutional ratifying conventions of
the several states."1 Many members of the conventions considered
7 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 129 (8th ed. 1927). See Mononga-
hela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1892). "But like the other
powers granted to Congress by the Constitution the power to regulate com-
merce, is subject to all the limitations imposed by such instrument, and among
them is that of the Fifth Amendment .... ; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S.
27 (1903); Hammond v. Clark, 136 Ga. 313, 71 S. E. 479 (1911) (an excellent
statement of this constitutional rule appropriately applied).
s Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U. S. 141 (1900) (Fifth Amendment limits the
commerce power); United States v. Lynch, 188 U. S. 445 (1902) (same); United
States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316 (1916) (same); United States v. Chambers, 291 U.
S. 217 (1934) (the Twenty-first Amendment repeals the Eighteenth); United
States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935) "So far as the reservations of the
Tenth Amendment were qualified by the adoption of the Eighteenth the qual-
ification has been abolished (by the Twenty-first Amendment)."
9 Everards Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1923) (impliedly recognizes
the Eighteenth Amendment modifies the Tenth with regard to Congress's
"concurrent power" to control liquor traffic within the states); Patton v.
United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1929) (Sixth Amendment and Art. III, Sec. 2,
Clause 3 of the Constitution are not in conflict - impliedly recognizes the
rule).lo McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 61 (1903).
"1See 4 ELLIOT, DEBATEs ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 242, 244 (1836).
The North Carolina Convention refused to ratify the Constitution until the
amendments were made a part of it and first on their proposed list of amend-
ments was one of the same effect as the Tenth. 3 id. at 625, 659. Virginia
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it and the other proposed amendments as conditions precedent
to their vote for ratification of the Constitution itself. Through-
out the debates it appears that the greatest fear was that the Fed-
eral Government would, if no positive restrictions were stated as
to the extent of its delegated powers, constantly usurp both the
powers of the states and the freedom of individuals.12 Apparently
many believed that if the statement that "the powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people",
were in the document then the other amendments would not be so
necessary as Congress would be so limited by this clause that it
would have no powet by implication over the liberties of the peo-
ple. Soon it became obvious that the fight at the conventions was
not between those who were against ratification entirely and those
for it, but rather was between those who desired to ratify with a
concurrent proposal, of amendments to Congress and those who
thought ratification should be withheld until the amendments were
made a part of the Constitution.13 By their actions the members
of the conventions indicated they intended to give real effect to
these limitations on the powers of the Federal Government. Con-
sidering the first ten amendments in the light 6f history it is hard
to see how the Court can give a different interpretation to the
Tenth than it does to the other nine and certainly no court would
dare say the First or Fifth are "mere truisms".
In contrast, it is interesting to note how different the prob-
lem was at the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787
where many of the delegates expressed fears such as Mr. Madison's
that "I apprehend the greatest danger is from the encroachment
of the states on the National Government." 14 It was principally
placed first on her list of amendments one equivalent to the present Tenth.
See 2 id. at 177, 406, 545 and 550 for similar action by Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland respectively.
12See 3 ELUiOT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 608, for an example of this in the
arguments of Mr. John Dawson of the Virginia Convention, that the unlimited
powers of the Federal Government would result in "consolidated government",
which is ,but symbolic of the fears expressed by most of the members of the
various conventions who favored the adoption, but with amendments.
is See 3 ELmorr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 628. And see 4 id. at 242 for
the final action of North Carolina in withholding ratification until amendment.
14see I ELIo'rr, op. cit. supra note 11, at 432. Also interesting is the
changed views of Mr. Madison between the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion and 1798 when he became the leader of the opposition to Hamilton's
theories of the power of the National Government. See ELLIOrr, THE Bio-
GRAPHICAL STORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 111 (1910).
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such attitudes as this which made it necessary for the members of
the state ratifying conventions to propose the amendments which
expressed the feelings of the majority of the people toward the Na-
tional Government.
In submitting amendments to limit the power of the Federal
Government the state conventions were not content with the word-
ing of the Tenth Amendment as we know it today, but were in-
tent on limiting the powers granted to the United States to those
"expressly" or "clearly"'", given it. It seems to be unanimous
opinion that this wording was carried over fromn the Articles of
Confederation, which in Article II stated, "Each state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, juris-
diction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly
delegated to the United States in Congress assembled." 10
However when the First Congress met and voted to submit
twelve amendments, which had been proposed by the state con-
ventions, to the state legislatures for their adoption the word "ex-
pressly" was omitted from the twelfth thereof.17  The struggles
which the Continental Congress had had with this word in the
articles were doubtlessly present in the minds of many of the Con-
gress sufficient to cause its withdrawal.'8 In spite of the omission
of this word which a majority of the ratifying states had desired,
the state legislatures eventually ratified ten of the twelve amend-
ments as submitted by Congress. 19
Although it is hard to set dates even as broad as a year when
the Court changed from a Hamiltonian outlook to a Madisonian
one or vice versa, yet it is possible to divide United States constitu-
tional history into three definite periods when the major theory of
the Court was one or the other of these doctrines. No claim is
made that all the decisions within the years given to outline a per-
Ir 2 ELLIOT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 177, 406, 550, 545.
18 1 ELLiOT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 79.
17 See I ELLIOT, op. cit. supra note 11, at 338. The present Tenth Amend-
ment was number twelve on the list.
18 See United States v. The William, Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, at 622 (D.
Mass. 1808) "Congress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors,
under the Confederation were, to the alternative of construing the term, express-
ly, with so much rigour, as to disarm the government of all real authority
whatever; or, with so much latitude, as to destroy altogether the force of the
restriction."
19 See CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT iT" MEANs TODAY 148 (8th ed.
1946). The adoption of the first ten amendmelits took 810 days, considerably
longer than the average of the subsequent eleven.
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fod hold for that theory. Some cases start the gradual change from
one to the other theory while others are merely interspersed ex-
ceptions -that prove the rule.
As to the first period which was as unanimously Hamiltonian
as Marshall and the other Federalist judges could make it, the pe-
riod of its supremacy is sharply drawn starting with the adoption of
the Amendment in 1791 and ending in 1837.20 The second, though
the, starting point of its Madisonian philosophy is certain in 1837
and its closing date of 193621 is equally certain, has some deci-
sions22 in the latter forty years of the period which coincide with
the Hamiltonian doctrine. The decisions from 193723 to the
present day in some instances "out-Marshall Marshall" in their
forceful assertion of the federal supremacy ideology.
It is not surprising that the first era in the development of the
Amendment was Hamiltonian in outlook for it was but natural
that Washington should appoint Federalists to the Court,24 but it
is unusual that that Court should succeed in maintaining its posi-
tion thirty:six years after the party had lost power and the major-
ity of the people had come to be strong advocates of states rights
as symbolized by the Amendment. 25
Although the first case which discussed and judicially disposed
of the Amendment was not until 1808,20 yet the Court had pre-
viously interpreted the Constitution on matters pertinent to the
Amendment without mention of it.27 This first decision was by a
federal district court and' concerned a controversy under the Em-
20 See New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837). This case can be taken
as definitely putting an end to the theories of Chief Justice Marshall by its
holding that the police powers of a state are not surrendered or restrained by
the Constitution and in relation to those the authority of a state is complete,
unqualified and exclusive.
21See Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513 (1936); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936) (strong assertions of the Madisonian doc-
trine but one year before the definite return to Hamiltonianism).2 2 See Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); Minnesota Rate Case, 230
U. S. 352 (1913); Everards Breweries v. Day, 265 U. S. 545 (1923); United States
v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716 (1931).
23 See Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937); Darby v. United
States, 312 U. S. 100 (1940); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111 (1942).
•24 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNrrED STATES HiSTORY 35 (1922).2 5 See CORWIN, THE COMMERCE PowER VERsus STATE RIGHTS 132 (1936).
"Unusual" compared with the Court of 1932 which could maintain its plh-
losophy for only five years against contrary political views.2 8 United States v. The William, Fed. Cas. No. 16,700 (D. Mass. 1808).
27See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 1793); Ware v, Hylton, 3
Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796).
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bargo Act of 1807. Although the Government was now under the
administration of Jefferson, who was the strongest advocate of
states rights of his day, the district judge in an opinion annotated
with frequent references to the "Federalist", sustained this act of
the Republicans at the expense of the Tenth Amendment by hold-
ing: "The general position is incontestable, that all that is not sur-
rendered by the Constitution, is retained. The Amendment which
expresses this is for greater security; but such would have been the
true construction without the amendment." 28
The honor for the first consideration of the Amendment by
the Supreme Court 29 goes to Mr. Justice Joseph Story,30 an advocate
of Federalism equal almost in ardour to Chief Justice Marshall.
Here the Justice merely cited the Amendment in proving his
proposition that the Constitution was established by the people of
the United States and not by the states and therefore if the people
granted a power in the Constitution the states had no right to ob-
ject to its exercise by the Federal Government, ignoring all the
while the fact that the people had demanded a limitation on the
power of the Federal Government and secured it by the first ten
amendments.31
However, it was reserved to Chief Justice Marshall to express
in binding words his theory of the Amendment and of the Federal-
State system of government.32 He disposed of the Amendment by
28 United States v. The William, Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, at 622 (D. Mass. 1808.
Compare these words with those of the Court 132 years later in Darby v. United
States, 312 U. S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1940) quoted on page (1) supra.
29 Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
30 See 1 WAmEN, THE SuPrrEm COURT IN UNITED STATEs HIsTORY 419 (1922)
for the interesting history of Justice Story's change from Madison's to Hamil-
ton's views. See also STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE Co NsTIunoN § 1908 (5th ed.
1891), for the extra judicial assertions by the Justice on the Amendment.
31 See Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434 (U. S. 1847) "The prohibition alluded
to as contained in the amendments to the constitution, as well as others with
which it is associated in those articles, were not designated as limits upon the
State governments in reference to their own citizens. They are exclusively
restrictions upon federal power, intended to prevent interference with the
rights of the States, and of their citizens. Such has been the interpretation given
to those amendments by this court, in the case of Barron v. The Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243; and such indeed is the only rational
and intelligible interpretation which those amendments can bear, since it is
neither probable nor credible that the States should have anxiously insisted to
ingraft upon the federal constitution restrictions upon their own authority, -
restrictions which some of the States regarded as the sine qua non of its adoption
by them"; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131 (1887); Minnesota & St. Louis Ry. v.
Bombolis, 241 U. S. 211 (1916).
32 McColloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
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saying it "was framed for the purpose of quieting excessive jeal-
ousies which had been excited", and then further stated "that the
government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action" and as to what is within that sphere
"by this tribunal alone can the decision be made."33  Given such
premises and the background of the Chief Justice there could be
little doubt as to the conclusion. He was also careful to point out
that the word "expressly" had been omitted from the Amendment
and thus the doctrine of implied powers was free to operate in de-
termining what had been delegated to the United States. One
cannot but question the logic of the Chief Justice in turning this
Amendment, the primary purpose of which had been to restrict
the Federal Government to its fields of granted powers, into an-
other "proof" that the founders of the Constitution had intended
that Congress have power to create a bank and therefore the states,
to which the Amendment reserved essential sovereign powers,
could not tax such bank. Although the ends which the Chief
Justice achieved may be admired, the means may well be criticized.
In the famous case of Gibbons v. Ogden," the Chief Justice
further bantered the Amendment dismissing it in one sentence as
"no limitation" on the commerce power. At first blush one won-
ders why counsel for Ogden failed to argue from the viewpoint of
the Amendment to show the reserved power of New York over its
waters, yet when one considers their closeness to the opinion in
McColloch v. Maryland3 and their knowledge of Marshall's per-
sonal feelings on the matter, it does not seem so logical. In
language which epitomizes the Hamiltonian doctrine the opinion
states "This power (over commerce) like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its upmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
Constitution."3 6
There is, however, one case37 in which the Chief Justice found
it necessary to modify in some degree the broad statements which
he had made in Gibbons v. Ogden, and to recognize that there was
33 Id. at 401, 406.
34 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
35 4'Wheat. at 374. Even counsel for Maryland regarded the Amendment
as "merely declaratory". See 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISroRY 587 et seq., for an excellent account of judicial and extra-judicial
occurrences in connection with Gibbons v. Ogden.
38 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (U. S. 1824).
.7Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829).
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a field in which the states could exercise their powers even though
it was within the domain of the all powerful power of Congress
over commerce. The State of Delaware had granted a company
permission to build a dam on a "navigable stream within the state
and the plaintiff, whose navigation on the stream was interfered
with, argued that in Gibbons v. Ogden it was stated that the power
to regulate commerce is exclusively granted to Congress and no
state could interfere with any matter under that power. Chief
Justice Marshall apparently recognizing that his dictum was too
broad stated: "Measures calculated to produce these objects (health
and wealth of the state's inhabitants) provided they do not come
into collision with the powers of the general government, are un-
doubtedly within those which are reserved to the states,"33 and that
unless Congress had passed an act to control such streams the state
could regulate them.
So completely was the Amendment relegated to the field of
"truisms" by Marshall's Court that it seems never to have been
raised again in the remaining years of his Chief Justiceship. How-
ever, the Court when relieved of his overwhelming control were
not amenable to the nugatory effect he had given the Amendment
and within two years of his death gave new life to the Tenth
Amendment.
The decision which effected this was New York v. Miln, 9 in
1837. In holding that a law of New York was valid which re-
quired captains of ships arriving in New York from foreign ports
to report in writing the names, ages and last legal settlement of
every person on board their vessels the court stated:
"We choose rather to plant ourselves on what we consider
impregnable positions. They are these: That a state has the
same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons
and things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation;
where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the
constitution of the United States. That, by virtue of this, it
is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a
state, to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity of its
people, and to provide for its general welfare, by any and every
act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive to these
ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the man-
ner of its exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the man-
ner just stated. That all those powers which relate to merely
38 Id. at 251.
so 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837).
235
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municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more properly
be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrain-
ed; and that, consequently in relation to these, the authority
of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive. ' '40
The Court by Mr. Justice Barbour places its decision directly on the
Tenth Amendment, but Mr. Justice Thompson, in his concurring
opinion 4' prefers to show in addition that .this is one of the sub-
jects a state might exercise power over until Congress had acted,
basing his opinion on Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.42 This
second ground is rather doubtful as several acts of Congress had at-
tempted to control immigration of the nature New York was gov-
erning.
This decision had the effect of raising the Tenth Amendment
back to a position equal to the other amendments and further gave
the logical effect contended for by the rule that an amendment
must serve the purpose for which it was intended, i. e., to qualify
preceding portions of the Constitution with which it conflicts
which in this instance was undoubtedly the commerce power and
the supremacy clause. 43  It further marked the beginning of a
Madisonian era that was to last almost one hundred years with but
a few contrary decisions in the latter third of its time.
The next approvals of the doctrine succeeded in strengthening
the Amendment's position. ] irst of these were the License Cases,44
which involved laws of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and New
Hampshire requiring licenses for the sale of liquor within the
respective states, even when the liquor had been imported from
other states or countries. The opponents of these laws contended
they violated the doctrine of Brown v. Maryland, 4 another Mar-
shall decision of 1827, which had set forth the "original package"
doctrine in connection with the commerce power. Although there
were six opinions by the Judges they were unanimous in holding
40 Id. at 139.
41 Id. at 143.
422 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829).
43 See CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 174. Pro-
fessor Corwin admits that "the Court has at various time reiterated this or
equivalent doctrine, although its logical incompatibility with the supremacy
clause seems dear", but the Professor in none of his writings seems to recog-
nize that an amendment controls where there is a "logical incompatibility"
between it and a prior article.
445 How. 504 (U. 8. 1847).
45 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827).
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that such laws came within the reserved police power of the states
and did not conflict with Congress's power over commerce.
After this case there were several which expressed complete
approval of the "reserved powers of the States" position, yet they
are but repetitions of the doctrine of New York v. Miln, and the
License Cases regarding the Amendment so that extended discus-
sion of them is not necessary.46 The attitude of the Court in these
cases may best be summed up by the statement of Mr. Justice Daniel
in the License Cases where he says: "Every power delegated to the
federal government must be expounded in coincidence with a per-
fect right in the States to all that they have not delegated; in co-
incidence, too, with the possession of every power and right neces-
sary for their existence and preservation; for it is impossible to
believe that these ever were, in intention or in fact, ceded to the
generpl government.1 47
The next decision of importance to the vitality of the Amend-
ment was Collector v. Day,4 8 in 1870, in which the Court basing its
opinion primarily on the Amendment held that the Federal Gov-
ernment could not tax the income of a state judge. The force which
the Amendment has gained by this time relative to the supremacy
clause is illustrated by the words of the Court: "It (the taxing
power) is, therefore, one of the sovereign powers vested in the
States by their constitutions, which remained unaltered and unim-
paired, and in respect to which the State is as independent of the
46 See The Passenger Case, 7 How. 283 (U. S. 1849) (although the laws of
New York and Massachusetts taxing aliens arriving at their ports were held
unconstitutional, in a 5-4 decision, the Madisonian theory stands out vividly
even in some of the majority opinions); Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393 (U. S.
1857) (the Dred Scott decision, a strong presentation of states rights ideology);
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U. S. 1860) (another emphatic view of the
right of a state.official to refuse to give up a fugitive from justice from an-
other state in spite of Art. IV, Sec. 2, Par. 2 of the Constitution); Lane County
v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71 (U. S. 1868). "In many articles of the Constitution the
necessary existence of the states, and, within their proper spheres, the inde-
pendent authority of the States, is distinctly recognized. To them nearly the
whole charge of interior regulation is committed or left; to them and to the
people all powers not expressly delegated to the national government are re-
served" (emphasis added - which indicates very definitely how the Court of
this era thought); Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1868) "It may not un-
reasonably be said that the preservation of the States and the maintenance of
their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution
as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National Govern-
ment"; United States v. Dewitt, 9 Wall. 41 (U. S. 1869) (the commerce power
of Congress does not extend to police regulations within the states).
475 How. at 613.
4s 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
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general government as that government is independent of the
States. The supremacy of the general government, therefore, so
much relied on in the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff in
error, in respect to the question before us, cannot be maintained.
Ihe two governments are upon an equality. .... ,,4)
That even the Civil War and the resulting Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments did not change the Supreme
Court's view of the Amendment as a guarantee of reservation of
power to the states to control persons and things within their bor-
ders is illustrated by the Slaughter House Case-'' and the Civil
Rights Case.'"1 In the former decision it was the Tenth Amendment
which saved to the state the right to regulate business within its
area regardless of the effect on interstate commerce and the priv-
ileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
the latter the power of Congress to compel individuals within the
states to grant equal privileges to all persons was denied because
"it is repugnant to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution."' -'
These two cases further serve to illustrate the ideology which
regarded the Amendment as an effective part of the Constitution
and which placed certain things commonly within the power of
the states beyond the power of Congress. The Court since 1837
had firmly expressed this idea without any encroachment. How-
ever, in 1872, once again the commerce power was given some force
by the State Freight Tax Case.5 3 The holding of this case can be
fitted into the pattern of the Amendment's power and purpose for
the Court was careful to point out that this was the negative pur-
pose 4 for which the commerce clause was provided, i. e., to prevent
state laws which would burden the commerce between the states.
The few decisions55 on this subject in the following years limited
the powers of the states only in that state laws which were a burden
on interstate commerce were held void and did not extend the
power of the Federal Government into fields reserved to the states.
49 ld. at 126.
50 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
7' 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
52Id. at 15.
53 15 Wall. 282 (U. S. 1872).
54 See Abel, The Commerce Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in
Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. RFv. 482, at 475 (1941). "All the extant
contemporary evidence thus tends to confirm Pickney's and Madison's recollection
that the power as to commerce between the states was in the main a negative
and preventive provision: It was a shield against state exactions and no two-
edged sword of positive federal attack."
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The fact that the Slaughter House Case was contemporaneous with
the State Freight Tax Case and the Civil Rights Case was later is a
further indication that this case was amenable to the Court's idea
of the Amendment.
The Court a few years later in a most emphatic manner showed
it had no thought of reducing the effect of the Amendmentu The
power of Congress by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to end a sugar
monopoly was denied solely because "It is vital that the independ-
ence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the
delimitation between them, however sometimes perplexing, should
always be recognized and observed, for while the one furnishes the
strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation of
the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of govern-
ment; and acknowledged evils, however grave and urgent they may
appear to be, had better be borne, than the risk be run, in the effort
to suppress them, of more serious consequences by resort to ex-
pedients of even doubtful constitutionality."' 7
In the same year the famous Income Tax Case-' was handed
down which, among other things, reaffirmed the doctrine of Col-
lector v. Day, that the income from a municipal corporation's bonds
could not be taxed by the Federal Government as such would be a
burden upon the states and their instrumentalities.
However, in 1903 the first real encroachment upon the Madi-
sonian ideology, which had preponderantly controlled the decisions
of the Court since Marshall's death, occurred. In that year The
Lottery Case"5 held that the commerce power of Congress was suf-
ficient to prevent the carrying from one state to another of lottery
tickets even though neither state in question prohibited sale of
such tickets. The principal argument against this statute had been
that the matter was one within the so-called "police powers" of the
state to allow or prohibit as it saw fit and that Congress could not
5. See Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259 (1875) (tax on passengers land-
ing at New York City port - void); Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S.
238 (1876) (ionnage charge by state on ships docking in New York - void);
Robbins v. Shelby Tax District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887) (state tax on out-of-state
drummers and merchants-void).
56 United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (The Sugar Trust case), 156 U. S. 1
(1895).
57 Id. at 13.
58 Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
59 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
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enter the field. That the question was a hard one is indicated by
the five to four decision. This decision meant that the positive
power of Congress over matters in interstate commerce had returned
to the scene.
Those persons who saw in this opinion a rise of national power
with a resulting limitation of the Tenth Amendment were soon to
be disappointed for three years later the Court00 reaffirmed its be-
lief in the power of the Amendment in such a manner that there
could be no doubt as to its "real effect". The Court in denying
the power of the Federal Government to intervene in a dispute
between Kansas and Colorado over the waters of the Arkansas River
because the subject of irrigation of arid lands was for the states
said: "This Amendment, which was seemingly adopted with pre-
science of just such contention as the present, disclosed the wide-
spread fear that the National Government might, under the pres-
sure of a supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise power
which had not been granted. With equal determination the
framers intended that no such assumption should ever find justi-
fication in the organic act, and that if in the future powers seemed
necessary they should be granted by the people in the manner they
had provided for amending that act. . . .This Article X is not
to be shorn of its meaning by any narrow and technical construc-
tion, but is to be considered fairly and liberally so as to give effect
to its scope and meaning.""1 In this case the Court was not bother-
ed with the commerce clause for the Federal Government was at-
tempting to assert a power over this arid land without reference
to its power over navigation of the river. Although the opinion is
a strong proponent of the Amendment's power it did not settle
the conflict raised by The Lottery Case, i. e., commerce power ver-
sus police power.
However, a short time later a somewhat analogous situation 2
arose in which the power of Congress over aliens as derived from
Article I, Section VIII, Paragraph 4 of the Constitution came in
conflict with the reserved power of the states. Congress provided
that whoever kept an alien woman for purposes of prostitution
within three years of her entry into the United States should be
subject to fine and imprisonment. The Court held the Act un-
60 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1906).
63 Id. at 90.
62 Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138 (1908).
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-constitutional on the basis that the control of individuals, either
citizens or aliens, after they were within the states was a matter of
state power "for, as stated there is in the Constitution no grant to
Congress of the police power."63  In saying "While the acts of
Congress are to be liberally construed in order to enable it to carry
into effect the powers conferred, it is equally true that prohibitions
and limitations upon those powers should be fairly and reasonably
enforced,"64 the Court was giving effect to the Amendment over
the supremacy clause for here was a direct struggle between a grant-
ed power and a power reserved to the states.
The proponents of strong national government basing their
plans on decisions such as The Lottery Case, The Minnesota Rate
Cases"s and others68 of like import, determined that Congress had
power to prevent an article manufactured by child labor from be-
ing transported in interstate commerce. 7 Here the Court was
faced with the bare problem of allowing the extension of the com-
merce power to control manufacture within a state or to restrict
the power because the matter was one within the state's power to
forbid or allow as it saw fit. Mr. Justice Day, for the Court, started
by distinguishing the cases on which the law was based by saying
they gave Congress power to prohibit things harmful in themselves
while the articles manufactured by child labor were not per se
harmful. He concluded saying: "The far reaching result of up-
holding the Act cannot be more plainly indicated than by pointing
out that if Congress can thus regulate matters entrusted to local
authority by prohibition of the movement of commodities in inter-
state commerce, all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the
power of the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus
63 Id. at 148.
64 Id. at 149. However, cf. Zakonate v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272 (1912), where
without mention of The Keller case the Court said "The appellant (an alien
prostitute) raises some other constitutional questions, viz.: that the Immigration
Act vests in the federal authorities the power to try an immigrant for a viola-
tion of the penal laws of the State of which he has become a resident, and so
interferes with the police power of the State; .... These are without sutstance
and require no discussion."
85 230 U. S. 352 (1912).
66 See Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904); Adams
Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218 (1909); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.
S. 308 (1912). But see Employers Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (1908), which
attempted a similar control over employees of interstate businesses and was held
to be unconstitutional.
67 Hammer v. Dagenbart, 247 U. S. 251 (1917).
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our system of government practically destroyed. ' ' s Although this
case was severely criticized from all sides, the viewpoint of the critics
was principally humanitarian. There was adequate constitutional
authority for the decision and as Mr. Justice Day pointed out,
".... all manufacture intended for interstate shipment would be
brought under federal control to the practical exclusion of the
authority of the States, a result certainly not contemplated by the
framers of the Constitution when they vested in Congress the
authority to regulate commerce among the States."""
The decade and a half which followed this decision saw some-
what of a see-sawing for power between the commerce clause and
the Amendment. The Court apparently recognized the validity
of Justice Day's distinguishing factor of The Lottery Case for it
approved similar regulations of things per se harmfu 70 as well as
harmful acts done in interstate commerce 7 1 but in other instances
disapproved extensions of the power of Congress in matters similar
to that in The Child Labor Case.72
During this era a new form of restriction on the powers re-
served to the states and a yet unexplored power of the Federal
Government entered the scene via Missouri v. Holland.':' Mr.
Justice Holmes by combining the wording of the treaty power
with that of the supremacy clause reached the astonishing conclu-
sion that "acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land when
made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared
to be so when made under the authority of the United States."'
Using this as a premise he arrived at the result that "no doubt
the great body of private relations usually fall within the control
of the State, but a treaty may override its power."'" One could
conjur up a thousand horrible examples of how tremendous such
68 Id. at 276.
69 Id. at 272. See also Abel, supra note 54, at 432 et seq.
70 See United States v. Daremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919) (Narcotic Drug Act).
71 See Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925) (Stolen Automobile
Act).
72 See United States v. Wheeler, 254 U. S. 281 (1920) (The Federal Criminal
Code did not apply to acts done within a state); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U. S. 20 (1922) (Child Labor Tax Case-Congress by the taxing power
could not achieve what the commerce power tried in Hammer v. Dagenhart);
Linder v. United States, 268 U. S. 5 (1925) (the Federal Narcotic Act could not
control a physician's prescription because "Obviously, direct control of medical
practice, in the States is beyond the power of the Federal Government").
73 252 U. S. 416 (1919).
74 Id. at 433.
75 Id. at 484.
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a power is, but it is sufficient to note that in his explanation of
the supremacy clause Mr. Justice Holmes made something that is
perhaps far greater than Chief Justice Marshall's commerce clause
as an instrument for depriving the states of their reserved powers.
With all due respect for the reasoning of Justice Holmes it can be
pointed out that he did not consider the limiting effect to be given
an amendment when there is a conflict between it and a prior
portion of the instrument. At some not too distant date it may
be necessary to call upon this rule of constitutional construction
to overcome this heretofore unknown power of the supremacy
clause for if carried to its logical conclusion it could change many
of the established concepts of the power of the Federal Govern-
ment.
The years of 1935 and 1936 were the most fruitful in the
Amendment's history judged both by the number T, and import-
ance of the decisions regarding it. The power of the Amendment
during these years is best demonstrated by the following summary
of the powers of the Federal Government which it limited to-
gether with brief excerpts from the opinions which indicate ex-
actly how much "real effect" the Court gave the Amendment dur-
ing these years: the commerce power as applied in the National
Recovery Act - "But the authority of the Federal Government
may not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the distinction,
which the commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce
among the several states' and the internal concerns of a state";'"
the taxing power as applied under the Revenue Act of 1926 -
"The affirmative of such a proposition would obliterate the dis-
tinction between delegated powers of the Federal Government
and those reserved to the States and to their citizens";-, the mon-
ctary power under the Federal Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 -
"In this there is an invasion of the sovereignty or quasi-sovereignty
of Wisconsin and an impairment of its public policy which the
State is privileged to redress as a suitor in the courts so long as
the Tenth Amendment preserves a field of autonomy against fed-
-'] See Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935); Hopkins Federal Saving Ass'n v. Cleary, 296
U. S. 315 (1935); Butler v. United States, 297 U. S. 1 (1935); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936); Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S.
513 (1936).
77 Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 550 (1935).
78 United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287, 296 (1935).
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eral encroachment";7 the taxing and commerce powers as com-
bined in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 - "From the
accepted doctrine that the United States is a government of dele-
gated powers, it follows that those not expressly granted, or rea-
sonably to be implied from such as are conferred, are reserved to
the states or to the people. To forestall any suggestion to the con-
trary the Tenth Amendment was adopted. The same proposi-
tion otherwise stated, is that the powers not granted are prohibited.
None to regulate agricultural production is given, and therefore
legislation by Congress for that purpose is forbidden";80 the same
two powers as presented in the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act
of 1985 - "The determination of the Framers Convention and the
ratifying conventions to preserve complete and unimpaired self-
government in all matters not committed to the general govern-
ment is one of the plainest facts which emerge from the history
of their deliberations. And adherence to that determination is
incumbent equally upon the Federal Government and the states"; 81
the bankruptcy power in the Bankruptcy Act Amendment of
1984 - "The sovereignty of the State essential to its proper func-
tioning under the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered;
it cannot be taken away by any form of legislation .... But noth-
ing in this tends to support the view that the Federal Government
acting under the bankruptcy clause, may impose its will and im-
pair state powers - pass laws inconsistent with the idea of sov-
ereignty".8 2
Inextricably associated with each of these powers of Congress
was the supremacy clause which attorneys for the Federal Govern-
ment urged as a controlling factor. In thus rejecting these argu-
ments the Court impliedly if not expressly recognized that all
previous portions of the Constitution in conflict with the reserved
powers of the states are restricted by the Amendment. The Court
in these cases rounded out almost a century during which the
great majority of decisions were completely in accord with the
purposes and acts of the Constitutional Ratifying Conventions,
as indicated by their debates and resolutions. In so doing the
Court did not have to give a strained interpretation to the Consti-
tution, but could give normal effect to all recognized rules of
79 Hopkins Federal Savings Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315, 337 (1935).
so Butler v. United States, 297 U. S. 1, 68 (1935).
81 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 295 (1936).
82 Ashton v. Cameron County District, 298 U. S. 513, 531 (1936).
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constitutional law which are inherent in a system of government
founded on the belief that more freedom and justice will result
when the organic act is reduced to writing and which can be modi-
fied only by the people by amendments.
The year of 1937 has been chosen as indicating a rebirth of
Hamiltonian ideology rather than an exception to the general
doctrine prevalent in the previous ninety-nine years, because it is
impossible to say that cases such as National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 3 Stewart Machine Co. v.
Davis,8 4 and Helvering v. Davis" and others of like import which
were reported in that year, are anything but contra to the general
rule of those cases starting with New York v. Miln8 in 1837 through
Ashton v. Cameron County District17 in 1936. An equivalent to
the extension of the powers of the National Government which
these 1937 cases created can be found only in Gibbons v. Ogden
and Mcolloch v. Maryland.
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the National Labor Relations
Case, while giving lip service to the Amendment,8 8 interpreted a
statute containing the words "affecting commerce" in such a man-
ner that subjects heretofore reserved to the states came within the
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. In spite of statements
of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis and in
Helvering v. Davis, that the Social Security Act did not violate the
Amendment, these decisions laid the foundation for overruling
of all the pro Amendment cases of the previous century. Although
the Court had sufficient authority for a tax system as the statute
in the former case provided with its connected system of credits
to the states,8 9 yet this system was so interwoven with the unem-
ployment plan in the latter case that had the Court chosen to con-
sider the Act as a whole as it did those in Butler v. United States
ai.d Carter v. Carter Coal Co., it would have arrived at a different
result. Further in Helvering v. Davis, Mr. Justice Cardozo states
he is accepting "The conception of the spending power advocated
by Hamilton and strongly reinforced by Story (which) has pre-
83 1ol U. S. 1 (1937).
84 S01 U. S. 548 (1937).
85 301 U. S. 619 (1937).
86 11 Pet. 102 (U. S. 1837).
87298 U. S. 513 (1936).
88 301 U. S. at 30.
89 See Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12 (1926).
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vailed over that of Madison, which has not been lacking in ad-
herents",90 but in actuality he is accepting the entire Hamiltonian
theory of the powers of the National Government. Dissenting
opinions"l to all three of these cases are based on the contention
that the Acts involved violated the Tenth Amendment.
In spite of the changed attitude of the Court as indicated by
these cases, it was not until 1941 that the Court had become so
firmly Hamiltonian that it could repeat in essence the words of a
Federalist Court of 1808, 902 i. e., "The Amendment states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.0 2
The foundation had been firmly laid for these words by several
decisions94 of the previous four years. The actual interpretation
of the powers of Congress was no broader than it had been in the
foundation cases, but the Court took this opportunity to set forth
its philosophy of the powers of the National Government. As a
result this decision has been considered as somewhat of a death
knell of the Tenth Amendment.9'- With this case as a premise it
is not surprising that the Court in later decisions while extending
the power of Congress into all fields previously reserved to the
states gave but cursory attention to the Amendment saying re-
peatedly, "It follows that no form of state activity can constitu-
tionally thwart the regulatory powers granted by the commerce
clause to Congress." 96
The Court has not been content with merely extending the
power of Congress wherever the Congress saw fit to expressly say
its power should extend, but has further extended by implication
90 301 U. S. at 640.
91 See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1, 76 (1937); Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 598 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619, 646 (1937). The total dissent in the latter
two cases is "Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Butler are of opinion
that the provisions of the Act here challenged are repugnant to the Tenth
Amendment."
92 See United States v. The William, Fed. Cas. No. 16,700, at 622 (D. Mass.
1808). See note 28 supra.
93 Darby v. United States, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1940).
94See Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. R., 299 U. S. 334
(1937); Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308 (1937); Wright v.
Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 502 (1938); United States v. Bekins, 304 U.
S. 27 (1938); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38 (1939).
9.- See Feller, The Tenth Amendment Retires, 27 A. B. A. J. 223 (1941);
Dodd, The Decreasing Importance of State Lines, 27 A. B. A. J. 78 (1941);
CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 174.
96 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 119 (1941); Wick-
ard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 124 (1942).
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [1949], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol51/iss4/3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
acts of Congress so as to limit the States in their exercise of neces-
sary governmental functions.97  Just how far these cases have
created a reduction of the States to co-equals with common citi-
zens of the United States instead of co-equals with the Federal
Government is demonstrated by the doctrine of New York v.
United States98 which the Court stated to be: "so long as Con-
gress generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned
and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Con-
stitution of the United States does not forbid it merely because
its incidence falls also on a State."99 Decisions such as this can
never be made to coincide with the constitutional doctrines on
which the United States federal-state system of government was
founded.
The scope of this paper is too brief to state the arguments pro
and con with regard to the benefits and detriments in the Madi-
sonian and Hamiltonian theories of government. That the prob-
lem is one on which the minds of reasonable men can differ can
be shown by listing the famous men who have been outspoken in
favor of each theory or by merely reading the decisions cited herein.
In concluding it is sufficient to point out that the doctrinal
development of the Tenth Amendment lends itself readily to an
outline in which those decisions favoring the supremacy clause
over all else in the Constitution are on one side and those holding
the Amendment modified that supremacy clause are on the other.
This is due to the fact that the courts have given effect to their
political philosophy in reaching their decisions and this in some
cases was achieved even to the extent of ignoring fundamental
rules of interpretation.
The rule of constitutional law which requires that a court-
consider always the amendments to a constitution to see if they
have modified the main body of the document is more than a mere
rule of interpretation, it is a basic fundamental in the system of
government based on a written constitution which can be modi-
fied only by written amendments. That the Constitutional Con-
vention recognized this is demonstrated by Article V of the Con-
stitution which prescribes the only method whereby the effect
97 See California v. United States, 320 U. S. 577 (1943); New York V.
United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946).
98 326 U. S. 572 (1946).
99 Id. at 582.
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of any portion of the organic law can legally be changed. When
"the people" add amendments they are exercising their pre-
rogative of sovereignty which as the preamble indicates is theirs
alone. If by the act of modification they see fit to limit any or
all of the powers previously given that is their privilege and no
person elected or appointed under the Constitution has the right
to gainsay that act.
One cannot read through those portions of Elliot, Debates
on the Federal Constitution, recording the actions of the state
ratifying conventions and arrive at the conclusion that by the first
ten amendments the people did not intend to seriously limit the
Constitution as it came from the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia. A court should never consider the body of the Con-
stitution without consulting the first ten amendments because
the two taken together establish the form of government we have
today. Had it not been for the assurances of all concerned that
the Constitution would be amended as soon as the First Congress
met there are indications that more states would have taken action
such as North Carolina did in refusing to ratify until the amend-
ments were made a part of the basic law. Neither can one read
the history of federal-state governments in general nor that of the
United States in particular without seeing the real effect intended
by the Tenth Amendment. Admitting the bias of the man, yet
there is a fundamental truth in the words of Jefferson that "When
all government shall be drawn to Washington as the center of all
power it will become venal and oppressive."
While admittedly some decisions by the Court following the
Madisonian theory may have gone too far in that they created a
blank space in the law between the jurisdiction of the National
Government and that of the state governments, yet this defect
could be remedied without making the states mere geographical
subdivisions of the United States as some of the recent Hamilton-
ian minded courts have apparently done. Were such a change
as this latter desired by the people, Article V provides a method
whereby it can be achieved, but until slich a change is effected,
which would no doubt necessitate the removal of the Tenth
Amendment from the Constitution, the courts should interpret
"every word, section and clause to give it real effect" and upon
finding such is impossible due to a conflict between the Consti-
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tution as originally adopted and another provision which has
been added by amendment that provision last established by "the
people" should modify pro tanto the former provision.
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